

## GEN Z IN TRANSITION: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND PRAGMATISM IN POLITICS

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### ABSTRACT

The 2024 general election positions Generation Z as a major electoral bloc (33.6% of voters), yet their engagement is often perceived as apathetic. This study examines the motivations of Gen Z's political participation and their relationship with participation typologies. A mixed-methods convergent design was applied, involving 200 Mataram University students. Quantitative data from questionnaires were analyzed using cross-tabulations, chi-square tests, and ordinal logistic regression, while qualitative data from open responses were thematically coded. Findings show that most respondents were spectators (57%), followed by critics (22%), gladiators (11.5%), and apathetic (9.5%). Idealistic motives (especially voice matters, policy change, and political education) were dominant. Chi-square tests revealed significant links between several idealistic factors and active participation, but in regression only political identity ( $B = -1.356$ ,  $p = .005$ ) consistently predicted critic and gladiator roles. Pragmatic motives (e.g., economic reward, mobilization) appear in narratives but lose significance in multivariate tests, indicating their role as situational triggers rather than structural drivers. These results highlight a paradox: Gen Z's participation is grounded in idealism yet negotiated within pragmatic realities. Politics for Gen Z thus emerges not merely as transactional, but as a space for identity, learning, and normative aspirations.

### INTRODUCTION

The 2024 simultaneous general elections mark an important milestone in Indonesian democracy, with Generation Z comprising 33.6 percent of registered voters, or around 66.8 million people (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2023). Combined with the millennial generation, this share exceeds 56 percent, positioning young voters as a decisive political force and potential agents of democratic change.

However, Gen Z's political participation is often regarded as low since their involvement rarely takes conventional forms such as campaign rallies or party membership. Instead, their expression unfolds predominantly in digital spaces such as TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube, which function both as arenas for shaping public



opinion and as spaces of entertainment and persuasion (Bossetta, 2018; van Dijck & Poell, 2013; Literat & Kligler-Vilenchik, 2024). Recent studies confirm this transformation, showing that social media provides a new infrastructure for political identity-building and mobilization among young Indonesians (Putra, Asrul, Rajab, & Nur, 2025).

Existing research shows that young people's political motivations are not singular. On the one hand, many are driven by idealistic orientations rooted in values, political identity, democratic learning, and policy aspirations (Dalton, 2008; Loader, Vromen, & Xenos, 2014). On the other hand, pragmatic considerations such as economic incentives, political mobilization, social reputation, and environmental pressures also shape participation (Pickard, 2017).

In terms of participation typologies, Milbrath and Goel (1977) originally classified political activity into three categories: apathetic, spectator, and gladiator. In the Indonesian context, however, Damsar (2012) expanded this framework by adding critic type which refers to citizens who consistently evaluate and comment on political actors and policies without necessarily engaging in formal political processes. Empirical evidence suggests that most young people remain in the passive categories of apathetic and spectator, while only a smaller proportion enter the more active roles of critic and gladiator (Setiawan & Djafar, 2023; Yusrin & Salpina, 2023). Similar findings are observed in Kepulauan Riau, where Hafifa et al. (2024) report that while youth demonstrate enthusiasm for elections, their involvement often stops at the spectator level without deeper institutional engagement.

Yet, studies that explicitly link political motivations to participation typologies remain scarce, particularly in Indonesia. Existing research has rarely addressed the paradox between Gen Z's political idealism and the pragmatic pressures they encounter in everyday political life. Understanding this paradox is crucial, as Gen Z holds significant potential to advance substantive democracy while at the same time being vulnerable to the persistent pull of electoral pragmatism.

Based on this framework, this study aims to: (1) identify Gen Z's motivations for political participation, (2) describe their participation typologies, (3) analyze the relationship between idealistic motivations and participation typologies, (4) analyze the relationship between pragmatic motivations and participation typologies, and (5) interpret the meanings embedded in these motivations. The proposed hypothesis is that idealistic motivations are positively associated with active participation typologies (critic and gladiator), whereas pragmatic motivations are more closely linked to passive typologies (spectator and apathetic).

## METHOD

This study employed a mixed-methods approach with a convergent parallel design. Quantitative data were analyzed to examine the relationship between political motivation and participation typology using cross-tabulations, chi-square tests, and ordinal logistic regression, while qualitative data were used to interpret respondents' narratives through thematic coding. This design was chosen to capture both statistical patterns and the contextual meaning of Generation Z's political motivation (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018).

The study was conducted at Mataram University, West Nusa Tenggara, involving students from five study programs. The research population consisted of Generation Z students (born after 1997), with a total sample of 200 respondents determined using purposive sampling techniques. The sample composition comprised 34.5 percent males



and 65.5 percent females, with the largest distribution coming from the Faculty of Economics and Business (39 percent), followed by the Faculty of Law, Social and Political Sciences (31.5 percent), and the Faculty of Teacher Training and Education (29.5 percent).

Data were collected in two waves. The pilot survey was conducted in late 2023 with 100 respondents to assess instrument clarity and reliability. This wave only included closed-ended items on political participation typologies. The main survey in early 2024 added another 100 respondents, maintaining the typology items while also introducing new closed- and open-ended questions on political motivations. Both waves targeted the same population, Gen Z students at Mataram University, so the combined dataset (N = 200) was consistent in scope. The 2024 survey therefore served a dual function: (1) providing qualitative data to explain typological patterns observed in 2023, and (2) increasing the quantitative sample size for typology analysis. Analyses of motivation–typology relationships were based solely on the 2024 wave, since motivation items were not included in the pilot.

Two analytical adjustments were made to the original questionnaire categories. First, the broader framing of “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” motivations was reconceptualized as “idealistic” and “pragmatic” motivations to better align with established political behavior literature. Second, one specific item, “policy change”, was shifted from the extrinsic to the idealistic category, since orientation toward substantive reform is more appropriately understood as a normative aspiration rather than an external incentive. These changes did not alter the raw responses but sharpened their analytical interpretation, ensuring both data integrity and theoretical clarity (Dalton, 2008; Downs, 1957).

Quantitative data were analyzed using cross-tabulations, chi-square tests, and ordinal logistic regression to test hypotheses. In the ordinal logistic regression, the dependent variable was coded Apathetic = 1, Spectator = 2, Critic = 3, Gladiator = 4. Under our parameterization of the proportional-odds logit, negative coefficients indicate a higher likelihood of membership in higher participation categories (critic/gladiator), whereas positive coefficients indicate a tendency toward lower categories (apathetic/spectator). Qualitative data were analyzed through thematic coding, combining deductive categories (idealism, pragmatism, efficacy, identity) with inductive insights from respondents’ accounts.


To ensure validity, quantitative consistency was maintained through standardized instruments and procedures, while qualitative trustworthiness was strengthened by triangulation of sources (comparing statistical and narrative findings) and triangulation of theory (drawing from political efficacy, rational choice, and political participation literature).

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Typologies of Participation

The typological distribution indicates that most respondents fall into the spectator category (57%), followed by critics (22%), gladiators (11.5%), and apathetic individuals (9.5%). This pattern suggests that Gen Z’s political participation is semi-active: they have moved beyond apathy, yet few translate their engagement into sustained activism.






**Figure 1. Semi-Active Pattern of Political Participation among Gen Z (n=200)**

Source: Author's calculation based on survey data, 2024

This resonates with Milbrath and Goel's (1977) participation pyramid, where spectators dominate while gladiators remain rare. Compared with earlier Indonesian studies (Setiawan & Djafar, 2023; Hafifa et al., 2024; Yusrin & Salpina, 2023), the proportion of critics in this study appears higher, reflecting a generational shift toward evaluative and discursive engagement even without formal activism.

### Idealism as Structural Driver

Survey results show that idealism is the dominant driver of Gen Z's political participation. The leading motivations were voice matters (36%), policy change (28%), and political education (25.5%), with smaller shares citing democratic process (15%) and political identity (12%).



**Figure 2. Idealistic Motivations of Gen Z (multi-response)**

Source: Author's calculation based on survey data, 2024

Cross-tabulations reveal that gladiators were most prominent among students motivated by political identity (41.67%) and policy change (25%), suggesting that ideals are more likely to propel activism.

**Table 1. Cross-Tabulations of Gen Z's Idealistic Motivations and Participation**

Motivations	Apathetic	Spectator	Critic	Gladiator
Voice Matters	6.94	61.11	12.50	19.44
Political Education	1.96	50.98	19.61	27.45
Democratic Process	3.33	36.67	30.00	30.00
Policy Change	0	58.93	16.07	25.00
Political Identity	0	37.50	20.83	41.67

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data (2024); cross-tabulations

Chi-square tests confirm that voice matters, political education, democratic process, policy change, and political identity were all significantly associated with critic or gladiator roles.

**Table 2. Chi-Square Test of Gen Z's Idealistic Motivations and Participation**

Motivations	Apathetic	Spectator	Critic	Gladiator
	( $\chi^2$ , p)	( $\chi^2$ , p)	( $\chi^2$ , p)	( $\chi^2$ , p)
Voice Matters	0.855 (.355)	0.776 (.378)	5.917 (.015*)	6.977 (.008**)
Political Education	4.526 (.033*)	1.012 (.314)	0.228 (.633)	17.114 (.000***)
Democratic Process	1.561 (.212)	5.954 (.015*)	1.316 (.251)	11.869 (.001**)
Policy Change	8.165 (.004**)	0.118 (.731)	1.593 (.207)	13.928 (.000***)
Political Identity	2.863 (.091)	4.231 (.040*)	0.022 (.883)	24.386 (.000***)

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data (2024); chi-square tests.

Regression analysis sharpens this conclusion: only political identity remained a consistent predictor of active participation ( $B = -1.356$ ,  $p = .005$ ), while political education and democratic process encouraged movement out of apathy but kept most students at the spectator level.

**Table 3. Regression Test of Gen Z's Idealistic Motivations and Participation**

Motivation	B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig. (p)	95% Confiden ce Interval (LB)	95% Confiden ce Interval (UB)
Voice Matters	0.251	0.352	0.510	1	0.475	-0.438	0.941
Political Education	-0.763	0.387	3.888	1	0.049*	-1.522	-0.005
Democratic Process	-1.030	0.417	6.100	1	0.014*	-1.848	-0.213
Policy Change	-0.198	0.386	0.262	1	0.608	-0.954	0.558
Political Identity	-1.356	0.479	8.022	1	0.005**	-2.294	-0.418

\*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data (2024); ordinal logistic regression

Qualitative triangulation reinforces the statistical findings by showing how ideals concretely operate in students' narratives. Voice matters was consistently invoked as a moral and civic anchor. As one respondent noted, "Because in my opinion, one vote can change our country's politics for the better" (R105, apathetic, Karena menurut saya satu suara itu bisa merubah politik negara kita ke arah yang lebih baik lagi). Another emphasized integrity in participation: "Because one vote is very valuable... I voted sincerely without any strings attached" (R186, spectator, Karena satu suara sangat berharga... saya memilih dengan jujur tanpa ada embel-embel). A more critical stance was voiced by another: "Because the voice of the people is very important for this country" (R130, critic, Karena suara rakyat sangat penting untuk negara ini). At the activist end, one gladiator asserted, "At the very least, I have contributed one ballot for what I believe in" (R122, gladiator, Setidaknya, saya sudah berkontribusi satu surat suara bagi apa yang saya yakini).

In terms of political education, narratives reveal its role as both cognitive empowerment and motivational energy. A student admitted, "By learning about politics, I can more easily understand Indonesia's political conditions" (R114, spectator, Dengan belajar tentang politik saya jadi mudah memahami kondisi politik di Indonesia). Another added, "The chance to learn more about candidates and the electoral process made me more aware and eager to participate" (R189, spectator, Kesempatan belajar lebih banyak tentang kandidat dan proses pemilu membuat saya lebih sadar dan ingin berpartisipasi). For others, education was framed as necessity: "Political education is needed so that Gen Z understands the political process in their own country" (R121, spectator, Pendidikan politik diperlukan agar Gen Z tahu proses politik di negaranya sendiri).

The democratic process was described as both experience and duty. A respondent argued, "By directly participating in voting, we can know what this country will become in the future" (R136, spectator, Dengan berpartisipasi langsung memilih... kita akan bisa tahu akan jadi apa negara ini ke depannya). Another saw democracy itself as justification: "Because of the sense of participating in a democratic political process" (R156, critic, Karena rasa berpartisipasi dalam proses politik yang demokratis). For first-timers, the act was framed as learning: "My first experience of learning democracy was through the election" (R94, spectator, Pengalaman belajar demokrasi pertama kali di pemilu).




Motivations linked to policy change reflect a strong sense of transformative aspiration. One gladiator explained, “Wanting a change” (R181, gladiator, Menginginkan adanya perubahan). A spectator echoed: “One vote matters and I hope for policy changes from the past” (R134, spectator, Satu suara penting dan berharap ada perubahan kebijakan dari sebelumnya). Another placed elections explicitly as a mechanism of transformation: “Elections are an instrument for changing the nation” (R130, critic, Pemilu sebagai instrumen perubahan pada negara). Similarly, a student connected participation to direct impact: “Political participation can bring better change, especially if it directly affects daily life” (R184, spectator, Partisipasi politik dapat membawa perubahan yang lebih baik... terutama jika berdampak langsung).

Finally, political identity was voiced as the foundation for consistency and meaning. One respondent stated, “Strong personal motivation about political issues makes engagement more consistent” (R141, spectator, Motivasi pribadi yang kuat tentang isu politik membuat keterlibatan lebih konsisten). Another emphasized the subjective dimension: “Political identity is formed from each individual’s subjective meaning of elections and participation” (R155, spectator, Identitas politik terbentuk dari makna subjektif tiap individu dalam memandang pemilu dan partisipasi).

These narratives reflect Dalton’s (2008) thesis of cognitive mobilization and Inglehart’s (1997) post-materialist framework, showing that Gen Z values democratic norms and political identity more than transactional benefits. For many, participation is not duty-bound but part of identity and self-expression, consistent with Pickard’s (2017) notion of politically engaged leisure. In conclusion, Gen Z’s idealism is not abstract but deeply embedded in moral responsibility, educational learning, democratic norms, aspirations for reform, and identity formation. This idealism thus functions as a structural driver, providing both the justification and the energy to move beyond apathy toward more active roles such as critics and gladiators.

### **Pragmatism as Situational Catalyst**

Alongside their ideals, students also admitted to pragmatic considerations, though these carried less structural weight. The most cited factors were political mobilization (16%) and economic reward (14%), followed by social reputation (10.5%), fear of consequences (8%), and social pressure (6.5%).



**Figure 3. Pragmatic Motivations of Gen Z (multi-response)**

Source: Author's calculation based on survey data, 2024

Cross-tabulations show that most students motivated by economic reward (64.29%) or mobilization (65.63%) remained spectators. A smaller share of gladiators acknowledged economic reward (25%) or social reputation (19.05%), suggesting that material incentives or reputational concerns can occasionally spark activism.

**Table 4. Cross-Tabulations of Gen Z's Pragmatic Motivations and Participation**

Motivations	Apathetic	Spectator	Critic	Gladiator
Economic Reward	3.57	64.29	7.14	25.00
Political Mobilization	9.38	65.63	15.63	9.38
Social Reputation	4.76	52.38	23.81	19.05
Social Pressure	15.38	53.85	15.38	15.38
Fear of Consequences	6.25	50.00	25.00	18.75

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data (2024); cross-tabulations

Chi-square tests refine these findings: only economic reward showed mild associations with critic ( $\chi^2 = 4.188$ ,  $p = .041$ ) and gladiator roles ( $\chi^2 = 5.830$ ,  $p = .016$ ). All other pragmatic variables (including mobilization, social reputation, social pressure, and fear of consequences) were statistically insignificant.



**Table 5. Chi-Square Test of Gen Z's Pragmatic Motivations and Participation**

Motivations	Apathetic	Spectator	Critic	Gladiator
	( $\chi^2$ , p)	( $\chi^2$ , p)	( $\chi^2$ , p)	( $\chi^2$ , p)
Economic Reward	1.331 (.249)	0.705 (.401)	4.188 (.041*)	5.830 (.016*)
Political Mobilization	0.001 (.979)	1.156 (.282)	0.902 (.342)	0.169 (.681)
Social Reputation	0.613 (.434)	0.204 (.651)	0.045 (.832)	1.313 (.252)
Social Pressure	0.560 (.454)	0.056 (.812)	0.355 (.552)	0.206 (.650)
Fear of Consequences	0.214 (.644)	0.348 (.555)	0.091 (.763)	0.898 (.343)

\* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data (2024); chi-square tests.

Regression analysis confirms this trend. Once idealistic variables were controlled, no pragmatic factor retained significance. Even economic reward, which was weakly significant in the chi-square test, lost explanatory power in the multivariate model (B = -0.205, p = .633).

**Table 6. Regression Test of Gen Z's Pragmatic Motivations and Participation**

Motivation	B	Std. Error	Wald	df	Sig. (p)	95% Confidence Interval (LB)	95% Confidence Interval (UB)
Economic Reward	-0.205	0.430	0.228	1	0.633	-1.047	0.637
Political Mobilization	0.692	0.425	2.649	1	0.104	-0.141	1.525
Social Reputation	-0.006	0.508	0.000	1	0.991	-1.001	0.989
Social Pressure	0.959	0.644	2.218	1	0.136	-0.303	2.220
Fear of Consequences	-0.202	0.601	0.113	1	0.737	-1.381	0.977

\*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01

Source: Author's calculations based on survey data (2024); ordinal logistic regression.

Narrative evidence further clarifies how pragmatic considerations influence Gen Z's political engagement. Economic incentives were explicitly mentioned as drivers of participation, though often framed as situational rather than deeply rooted. One respondent admitted, "Because sometimes we participate in politics depending on what the reward is, for example when there is an economic reward such as money distribution, it influences how we participate" (R163, spectator, Karena terkadang kita berpartisipasi dalam politik tersebut tergantung dari apa yang menjadi imbalannya, contohnya saja ketika adanya reward ekonomi seperti pembagian uang dan lain sebagainya maka akan mempengaruhi bagaimana kita akan berpartisipasi dalam politik tersebut). Another echoed this sentiment: "The giving of money, goods, or services as direct incentives can attract attention and encourage me to participate in elections" (R156, critic, Pemberian

uang, barang, atau jasa sebagai insentif langsung dapat menarik perhatian dan mendorong saya untuk berpartisipasi dalam pemilu).

Mobilization by external agents also appeared as a recurring theme. Respondents highlighted the role of family, teachers, and peers in shaping their decisions: "Because in this behavior I think teachers are one of the figures I can rely on in determining or strengthening my choice" (R155, spectator, Karena menurut saya dalam perilaku ini guru menjadi salah satu tokoh yang bisa saya andalkan dalam menentukan pilihan atau memperkuat pilihan). Another student reinforced this: "Encouragement from parents or other family members can shape young people's political views... creating strong social norms" (R101, spectator, Dorongan dari orang tua atau anggota keluarga lainnya dapat membentuk pandangan politik generasi muda... hal ini menciptakan norma sosial yang kuat).

Social reputation and peer pressure were also cited, indicating that participation was sometimes a means of maintaining recognition within one's community. As one explained, "Because that factor encourages me to engage in politics" (R160, spectator, Karena faktor tersebut mendorong saya untuk berpolitik). Others emphasized social obligation: "Because the encouragement from family makes us want to vote and uphold it" (R190, spectator, Karena adanya dorongan dari keluarga yang akan membuat kita mau untuk memilih dan menjaga). Fear of consequences added yet another dimension: "Because I usually assess from the community first before making a decision, fearing negative judgment" (R146, spectator, Karena biasanya saya menilai dari sosial masyarakat terlebih dahulu berkaitan dengan hal tersebut).

Together, these testimonies confirm that pragmatic motives are highly context-dependent: incentives, mobilization, reputation, and pressure can prompt action, but they lack the enduring quality of idealism. This reinforces Downs's (1957) rational choice perspective, where individuals act when external benefits outweigh costs, yet do not sustain engagement once the incentives disappear. Stipends, peer encouragement, or family persuasion may nudge participation but do not anchor it, aligning with Megawati et al. (2025), who show that youth involvement in money politics reflects situational inducements rather than civic motivation. Similar evidence from Gerber et al. (2008) and Gneezy & Rustichini (2000) also demonstrates that monetary incentives can initiate turnout but rarely sustain engagement. Pragmatism therefore operates less as a structural foundation than as a situational catalyst, nudging Gen Z toward participation without embedding it in lasting political identity or commitment.

### **The Paradox of Idealism and Pragmatism**

In sum, the findings reveal a paradoxical layering in Gen Z's political participation. Among spectators, participation is often framed as both a civic responsibility and a personal learning process, yet it remains entangled with pragmatic considerations. One respondent explained, "Due to personal needs, we choose the one who gives the most (money), and if no one gives money or anything else, then we choose the one we like... because the belief that my vote has value makes me feel that my involvement really has an impact" (R125, Karna keperluan pribadi, jadi kita memilih yang memberikan yang terbanyak, dan jika tidak ada yang kasi uang atau yang lainnya maka kita pilih yang kita suka... karena keyakinan bahwa suara saya memiliki nilai membuat saya merasa bahwa keterlibatan saya benar-benar berdampak). Another added, "Actually... people want to achieve political change, but the offer of rewards makes some people choose money instead" (R118, Sebenarnya... orang ingin mencapai perubahan politik, akan tetapi

adanya pemberian reward menjadikan sebagian orang memilih uang). These voices illustrate how idealism and pragmatism coexist: students value the democratic meaning of voting, yet acknowledge the lure of material rewards.

Among critics, the paradox becomes sharper. They defend participation as a matter of democratic principle, “because of the desire to participate in the democratic political process” (R156, karena rasa berpartisipasi dalam proses politik yang demokratis), but simultaneously recognize the rational pull of economic inducements: “The provision of money, goods, or services as direct incentives can attract my attention and encourage me to participate in elections” (R156, Pemberian uang, barang, atau jasa sebagai insentif langsung dapat menarik perhatian dan mendorong saya untuk berpartisipasi dalam pemilu). Here, rational-choice logic intertwines with civic ideals, showing that critics negotiate between normative commitment and the economic realities of electoral politics.

At the level of gladiators, idealism emerges most forcefully, with respondents stressing intrinsic motivation: “that intrinsic motivation makes me enthusiastic and feel more critical about current political issues” (R124, karena dengan dorongan intrinsik tersebut membuat sy (saya) menjadi bersemangat, dan merasa lebih kritis dalam isu-isu politik yang ada). Yet even here, extrinsic triggers such as material rewards, social recognition, and pressure from networks were acknowledged as part of the political experience. These admissions confirm that while activism is anchored in values and identity, pragmatic pressures continue to surface in everyday participation.

Taken together, these narratives show that Gen Z’s political engagement is not a simple binary between idealism and pragmatism, but a continuum where normative aspirations drive participation upward while pragmatic realities shape its everyday expression, echoing Dalton’s (2008) cognitive mobilization thesis and Downs’s (1957) rational-choice logic.

## CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that the political motivation of Generation Z at Mataram University is driven more by idealism than pragmatism. Belief in the power of individual voices, commitment to democratic procedures, aspirations for policy change, and especially political identity act as structural drivers that lift students from apathy into spectatorship, sustain critical engagement, and support activism at the gladiator level. Pragmatic considerations, such as economic incentives, social pressure, or mobilization, function largely as situational triggers rather than enduring motivations.

These findings highlight both the promise and vulnerability of Indonesia’s youngest electorate. On one hand, their idealism strengthens substantive democracy through value-driven participation and identity-based activism. On the other hand, the persistence of pragmatic pressures exposes them to the transactional logics of Indonesia’s electoral environment.

Policy reform is therefore crucial. Civic education must be strengthened to deepen political literacy and transform spectatorship into sustained activism. Electoral institutions should be reformed to curb clientelism, vote-buying, and transactional mobilization that undermine youth ideals. Inclusive political channels must be created to recognize and integrate youth values, while transparency and accountability in political processes must be advanced to ensure that Gen Z’s idealism translates into substantive democratic outcomes.



Future research should map regional variations of Gen Z's engagement, examining the interplay of socio-economic factors, digital culture, and local political structures. Such comparative studies will capture the complexity of Indonesia's youth electorate and provide a stronger foundation for policies that nurture their democratic potential.

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